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The purpose of this essay is to examine the question of
whether under Mississippi law the executor or administrator of
a deceased beneficiary's estate can effectively disclaim the interest
of the beneficiary. This narrow issue involves consideration of
disclaimers in general, common law principles, the Mississippi
Code of 1972, as amended, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
as amended, and, certain interpretative material of the Internal
Revenue Code.
A disclaimer has been defined as" '[tihe disavowal, denial,
or renunciation of an interest, right, or property imputed to a per-
son or alleged to be his.' "1 It is" 'a complete and unqualified refusal
to accept the rights to which one is entitled.' ' There can be no
disclaimer after an acceptance of the rights.
Generally, a testamentary beneficiary is entitled to renounce
or disclaim a devise or bequest in his favor.' This right of
disclaimer is based upon the general principle that no one should
be forced to take possession against his consent of what is com-
ing to him under another person's will. Although the beneficiary
may elect to assent to the inheritance or repudiate it, few
beneficiaries disclaim a devise or bequest in the absence of some
personal advantage arising from such rejection. However, the
benefit may actually inure to another person.
A primary concern is whether the advantage may be trans-
ferred to another without adverse transfer tax consequence. A
qualified disclaimer by a beneficiary will be treated for federal
tax purposes as if the disclaimed interest had never been transmit-
ted to the disclaiming beneficiary.' Consequently, the disclaim-
ing beneficiary will not be treated for either gift or estate tax pur-
* B.S., 1965, Mississippi College; J.D., 1967, University of Mississippi; LL.M. (Taxation),
1972, New York University. Associate Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law.
1. City Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 398, 402 (S.D. Ohio 1962)
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 550 (4th ed. 1951)), affd, 312 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963).
2. Parker v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 192, 199 (1974) (quoting S. Rept. No. 1013, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1948), 1948-1 C.B. 334), acq. 1974-2 C.B. 4; Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(c)(2) (1958);
Treas. Reg. § 20.2056 (d)-l(a) (1958); Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(d)(6) (1958).
3. 80 AM. JUR. 2D Wills §1597 (1975).
4. I.R.C. § 2518 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
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poses as having made a gift to the ultimate recipient of the in-
terest by reason of the disclaimer. The disclaiming beneficiary
has not transferred anything but has merely refused to accept the
devise or bequest under the decedent's will. Conversely, accep-
tance by the beneficiary of the devise or bequest followed by a
disposition in the form of a gratuitous transfer constitutes a gift
subject to tax.'
As a result of this tax treatment, disclaimers frequently allow
postmortem estate planning. For example, a disclaimer may be
utilized to increase or decrease the amount of the marital deduc-
tion available to a decedent's estate, or an interest which passes
to charity because of a disclaimer will be treated as a deductible
transfer to charity by the decedent who created the interest rather
than the disclaimant. A disclaimer enables an estate planner to
evaluate the overall tax consequence of the estate of both spouses.
At the death of the first spouse, an advisor may determine that
the surviving spouse should not receive any property from the
deceased spouse for the family's maximum advantage for
tax purposes.
HYPOTHETICAL
As an example, a husband and wife may be involved in an
automobile accident in which the husband is killed instantaneous-
ly. The wife is injured seriously and dies within a short time of
the date of the death of the husband. The husband's will leaves
everything to the wife, or in the event she does not survive, to
the children. The wife's will leaves everything to the husband,
or in the event he does not survive, to the children. With the pro-
per assumption of assets and values for the respective estates, it
may be more advantageous, from a tax standpoint, for the children
to receive some or all of the property from their father rather than
have it pass to their mother and inherit it from her. With good
health and the desire to do so, it is clear that the wife may refuse
to accept her devise or bequest from the husband. Principles of
common law, Mississippi law and the Internal Revenue Code allow
a surviving testamentary beneficiary to disclaim the devise or be-
quest. The question which arises concerns the propriety of a
disclaimer by the deceased wife's executor or administrator: May
the wife's fiduciary renounce or disclaim, as her personal represen-
tative, the interest the wife would have received?
5. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958).
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GENERAL DISCLAIMERS VERSUS STATUTORY
ELECTION AND RENUNCIATION
The question posed by the hypothetical has been answered
both affirmatively and negatively by decisions in jurisdictions out-
side of Mississippi. A substantial body of law indicates that an
executor or administrator may disclaim a bequest. "Unless a con-
trary intention is indicated by the provisions of the will, the right
of acceptance or renunciation is not ended by the death of the
devisee or legatee who had such right. Such right may be exer-
cised by his executor or administrator."6 However, if the will in-
dicates an intention that an acceptance or renunciation power shall
be personal to the beneficiary, the intention will be honored.7 The
proposition that the right of renunciation is not ended by the death
of the devisee or legatee but may be exercised by his executor
or administrator was recognized in In re Howe.' In that case, a
couple made wills leaving their respective estates to the other.
An automobile accident killed both spouses, but the wife died a
few days after the husband, never regaining consciousness. Within
four months after her death, the wife's administratrix tried to re-
nounce the provision in the husband's will. Apparently, the renun-
ciation would have prevented a double estate tax problem. The
court held that the right to disclaim may be exercised by the de-
ceased beneficiary's personal representative. However, the court
further held that the attempted disclaimer was not timely in this
jurisdiction.9
The court in Payne v. Newton,10 held that the death of a sur-
viving incompetent widow terminated her right to renounce her
husband's will, and thus appears contrary to Howe. It may,
however, be distinguishable. In Payne the widow's right to re-
nounce her husband's will was provided by Section 18-211 of the
D. C. Code, as amended, an election and renunciation provision.
The statute was silent as to whether the right to renounce con-
tinued after the death of the surviving spouse. Although similar,
this case differs from a general disclaimer, such as was dealt with
in Howe, in that it involved a statutory election and renunciation
which results in a statutory share being distributable to the re-
6. W. BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 49.5 at 42 (New Revised Treatise 1962).
7. Dyer v. Blair, 62 R.I. 498, 511, 6 A.2d 673, 679 (1969).
8. 112 N.J. Eq. 17, 22, 163 A. 234, 237 (1932); see also In re Kiosk's Estate, 169 N.Y.L.J.
21 (1973) (holding that, unless a contrary intention is indicated by the provisions of the will, right
of acceptance is not ended by the death of the devisee or legatee who has such right but may
be exercised by his executor or administrator).
9. 112 N.J. Eq. at 23, 163 A. at 237-38.
10. 323 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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nouncing spouse in place of the provision in the will. The doc-
trine of election in connection with testamentary instruments is
the principle that one who is given a benefit under a will must
choose between accepting such benefit and asserting some other
claim he has against the testator's estate or against the property
disposed of by the will.'
The general disclaimant has no other claim against the
testator's estate. A general disclaimer is a renunciation which mere-
ly allows a beneficiary to decline to accept the rights to which
he is entitled; he receives nothing in its place. This right to re-
nounce needs no statutory authorization.12 On the other hand, the
beneficiary who elects and renounces not only declines to accept
what is coming to him but also takes something else in its place.
The election is to take under a will or against it. In either event,
the beneficiary receives something. This right to elect only ex-
ists where it has been granted by statute. Since the statutes vary
considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in both their scope
and application, they should always be consulted.
The similarity of a general disclaimer and an election and
renunciation has resulted in opinions which have intertwined the
principles. The courts in some jurisdictions have held that the right
to disclaim is personal to the potential disclaimant and may not
be exercised by an executor or administrator. 3 These cases have
apparently arisen, however, in the context of a personal represen-
tative's attempt to exercise the statutory election and renuncia-
tion. A number of other cases have allowed a fiduciary to generally
disclaim.' In addition, it has been held that the court may order
a disclaimer on behalf of an incompetent."
Many states have passed specific legislation dealing with
disclaimers which contain provisions authorizing or prohibiting
disclaimers by executors and administrators. For example, Alaska
statutes provide that the right to disclaim does not survive the death
11. Moore v. Baker, 4 Ind. App. 115, 118, 30 N.E. 629, 629-30 (1892); Kentucky Trust Co.
v. Kessell, 464 S.W.2d 275, 276 (Ky. 1971); Lansdale v. Dearing, 351 Mo. 356, 360, 173 S.W.2d
25, 28 (1943); Logan v. Logan, 112 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
12. Perkins v. Isley, 224 N.C. 793, 798, 32 S.E.2d 588, 590 (1945).
13. Cahill v. Eberly, 38 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1930); Rock Island Bank and Trust Company
v. First National Bank, 26 I11. 2d 47, 185 N.E.2d 890 (1962); Andry Kowski v. Theis, 40 Ill.
App. 2d 182, 189 N.E.2d 3 (1963).
14. Perkins v. Phinney, 7 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1753 (W.D. Texas 1961); Estate of Robin v.
Commissioner, 68 T.C. 919 (1977), affd, 588 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1978); Estate of Dreyer v. Com-
missioner, 68 T.C. 275 (1977), acq. 1978-1 C.B. 1; Hoenig v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 471 (1976),
acq. 1978-1 C.B. 1; In re Estate of Glenn, 258 N.C. 351, 128 S.E.2d 408 (1962); McCrady
Estate, 42 Pa. D. & C.2d 519 (1966).
15. See, e.g., Hardy v. Richards, 98 Miss. 625, 54 So. 76 (1911); Delton v. Shaffer, 60 111.
2d 451, 328 N.E.2d 257 (1975).
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of a beneficiary."6 In contrast, New York law provides that a renun-
ciation on behalf of a decedent is allowable by the personal
representative of such decedent, provided proper court authoriza-
tion has been obtained. 7
The legislation in New York provides an illustration of the
distinction between a general disclaimer and a statutory election
and renunciation. The general disclaimer provision allows a renun-
ciation or disclaimer by the personal representative of a de-
ceased beneficiary.18 This right is referred to in the statute as a
disclaimer." The requirements and rights for an election and
renunciation by a surviving spouse are also provided by statute. "
The election allowed under this section is personal to the surviv-
ing spouse with the result that the personal representative of a
deceased spouse may not exercise any right on behalf of the
beneficiary. 2'
Mississippi's position on the issue is not free from doubt.
Mississippi has no general disclaimer statute, although it does have
statutes allowing an election and renunciation. "2 The Release of
Powers of Appointment Act" is related but does not appear to
be applicable. 4
The writer has been unable to find any case directly answer-
ing the question posed by the hypothetical. There is no question
that Mississippi adheres to the common law rule allowing a general
disclaimer. In Greely v. Houston the Mississippi Supreme Court
indicated that:
[a] devise or bequest does not become effective until accepted by the devisee or legatee,
who has the right to accept or decline it as he may desire; and, when a devisee or
legatee refuses to accept a devise or legacy, the property devised or bequeathed to
him will be dealt with as if the devise or legacy had not been made. 25
Further, the Mississippi Supreme Court held in Parker v.
Broadus,"6 that where a will contains no limitation, all the
beneficiaries may renounce the will and divide the property ac-
16. ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.295(a) (Supp. 1982).
17. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11(c) (McKinney 1981).
18. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11 (McKinney 1981).
19. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.110) (McKinney 1981).
20. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1981).
21. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1(d)(4) (McKinney 1981).
22. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 91-5-25 to 91-5-27 (1972 & Supp. 1982).
23. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 91-15-1 to 91-15-21 (1972).
24. Bishop v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1336, 1348 (N.D. Miss. 1970), affd mem., 468
F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1972).
25. 148 Miss. 799, 805, 114 So. 740, 742 (1927).
26. 128 Miss. 699, 91 So. 394 (1922).
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cording to a plan different from the one prescribed by the will.
In this case, the decedent's will left all his property to two sons.
A letter pinned to his will explained that this was being done due
to the "meding" (sic) of his girls in general and one in particular.
After his death, the beneficiary sons and other children entered
into an agreement. The beneficiary sons renounced the will and
agreed with the other children that the property should be divid-
ed equally among all the children, taking certain advancements
into account, to equalize each child's share of the estate. The
chancellor's opinion stated that "' A testator may confer by will
upon an heir a larger share of his estate than the law would give,
but the testator possesses no potential to compel the heir to ac-
cept it, nor may the court do so for him.' "27 In the writer's opin-
ion, Mississippi law provides a strong implication that a general
disclaimer or renunciation will be allowed to rearrange testamen-
tary desires provided there are no limitations in the will and all
the beneficiaries or their personal representatives agree. The writer
submits that the facts of the hypothetical should allow a general
disclaimer by the executor or administrator of the wife's estate.
Certainly nothing prohibits this result.
The area of general disclaimers should not be confused with
the election and renunciation rights pursuant to Mississippi
statute.2" The statute adopts the principle that a surviving spouse
who is a beneficiary under a will is permitted to choose between
accepting a benefit or asserting another claim against the estate.
In essence, a beneficiary may reject an unsatisfactory provision.
The statute allows the beneficiary to elect to refuse the testamen-
tary provision and receive a specified share of the estate. Addi-
tionally, the renunciation and election must be completed within
90 days after the probate of the will and is limited to surviving
spouses. Further, the spouse's right is a personal right which does
not survive the death of the surviving spouse and may not be ex-
ercised by his or her executor or administrator. ' It appears that
a stronger argument may be made for restricting the election and
renunciation right to the beneficiary personally than for so restrict-
ing a general disclaimer right. A determination of what is or what
is not "unsatisfactory" may vary between a beneficiary and a
deceased beneficiary's fiduciary. The sanctity of the surviving
spouse's share of the decedent's estate is at stake, and it should
27. 128 Miss. at 708, 91 So. at 395.
28. Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-25 (Supp. 1982).
29. Jenkins v. Borodofsky, 211 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1968); Estate of Mullins v. Estate of Mullins,
239 Miss. 751, 125 So. 2d 93 (1960); Carter v. Harvey, 77 Miss. 1, 25 So. 862 (1899).
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be a personal decision for the spouse. Further, the spouse receives
something, whether it is pursuant to the will or a statutory share.
Section 91-5-27 of the Mississippi Code is also similar though
inapplicable to general disclaimers. This section provides that in
circumstances where a decedent's will makes no provision for the
decedent's surviving spouse, the spouse has the right to share in
the estate of the decedent as in the case of an unsatisfactory pro-
vision. Under this section, a renunciation is not necessary. The
will is renounced by operation of law"0 without any affirmative
action by the surviving spouse, placing the surviving spouse in
the position of one who has renounced an unsatisfactory provi-
sion in a will.
In McBride v. Haynes,"' the Mississippi Supreme Court dealt
with the situation where a wife's will made no provision for her
husband. Three weeks after the wife's death, the husband died
without having taken any affirmative action with reference to her
will. His personal representative sought a share in the estate of
his pre-deceased wife as a matter of law. The court held that failure
to make a provision for the surviving husband vested a right in
the husband to a share of the deceased wife's estate. Further, that
right was exercisable by the executor of the estate of the husband.
It is arguable that when it is not necessary to determine
whether a provision is "unsatisfactory," the court may be more
liberal in allowing an executor or administrator to exercise rights
in regard to sharing in an estate. It is also arguable that allowing
an executor or administrator to determine to share in an estate
is not unlike, and is authority for, allowing an executor or ad-
ministrator to determine whether to decline to share in an estate.
Aside from the similarity of the situations, rights under neither
Section 91-5-25 nor Section 91-5-27 are the equivalent of general
disclaimer considerations. The election and renunciation rights
are purely statutory and are limited to particular situations. They
are applicable only to a surviving spouse beneficiary who makes
an affirmative election to renounce an unsatisfactory provision
received under the deceased's will, or for whom the law
automatically renounces in the absence of any provision for the
surviving spouse. Under either circumstance, a statutorily specified
share of the predeceased spouse's estate is received instead of the
unsatisfactory or absent provision. A statutorily specified time
30. Bullock v. Harper, 239 So. 2d 925, 926-27 (Miss. 1970); Cain v. Barnwell, 125 Miss.
123, 136, 87 So. 481, 483 (1921).
31. 247 So. 2d 129 (Miss. 1971).
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period is allowed for the renunciation and election for an un-
satisfactory provision; and, the law automatically renounces in
the absence of a provision as though it were within the time period.
In contrast, the general disclaimer or renunciation is not
limited to a surviving spouse beneficiary, is not necessarily limited
under Mississippi law to a specified time period for application,
is not limited to a situation where the provision is unsatisfactory,
has no application where a beneficiary receives no provision, and
does not necessarily allow a disclaiming beneficiary a specified
share or any share at all of the decedent's estate. In essence, a
general disclaimer or renunciation appears to be a complete
deviation from an election and renunciation rather than a nuance.
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAX PROVISIONS
The ultimate conclusion to the question posed in the
hypothetical must take into account federal estate and gift tax pro-
visions. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976,2 several courts
had held that a deceased beneficiary's executor or administrator
could make a valid disclaimer for the deceased beneficiary.33
As a general proposition, a personal representative acts in
the place of a decedent. Federal tax law recognizes the fiduciary
relationship and defines the rights and obligations of a fiduciary.
Section 6903 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that upon
proper notice, a fiduciary assumes the powers, rights, duties and
privileges of the person in whose place he acts. Section 7701 (a)
(6) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that the term "fiduciary"
means a guardian, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver, con-
servator, or any person acting in any fiduciary capacity for any
person. Once the relationship is established, the fiduciary is en-
titled to do anything the decedent could have done.
A recent case illustrating this concept is Gunther v. United
States." Mr. Gunther received a distributive share from a profit
sharing plan. Under section 402(a)(5) of the Internal Revenue
Code, he had a right to elect to rollover his distribution into an
individual retirement account within 60 days of receipt. Unfor-
tunately, he died before the end of the 60-day period. A bank was
appointed executor of his estate and the executor opened the in-
32. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520; Pub. L. No. 94-528, § 2(a)-(c), 90 Stat. 2483; Pub.
L. No. 94-568, § 3(a), 90 Stat. 2697 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
33. Perkins v. Phinney, 7 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1753 (W.D. Texas 1961); Estate of Robin v.
Commissioner, 68 T.C. 919 (1977), affd, 588 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1978); Estate of Dreyer v. Com-
missioner, 68 T.C. 275 (1977). acq. 1978-1 C.B. 1; Hoenig v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 471 (1977),
acq. 1978-1 C.B. 1.
34. 51 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1314 (W.D. Mich. 1982), 2 Estate & Gift Taxes FED. TAXES (P-H)
148,564 (1982).
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dividual retirement account on the decedent's behalf and deposited
the money from the profit sharing plan.
The Internal Revenue Service refused to recognize the trans-
action as a valid rollover pursuant to section 402(a) (5), claiming
the right to rollover is personal to the employee and cannot be
exercised by anyone else. The estate maintained that Section
6903(a) gave the executor all the powers, rights, duties and
privileges of the decedent. As a result of this, the estate main-
tained that the executor had the authority to rollover the distributive
share into an individual retirement account just as the decedent
could have done had he lived. The district court, Western District
of Michigan, Southern Division held for the taxpayer and against
the position of the Internal Revenue Service. This decision would
appear to be analogous to the question of this essay and would
be authority for the proposition that the executor or administrator
of a deceased beneficiary's estate can effectively disclaim the in-
terest of the beneficiary.
The Tax Reform Act added Internal Revenue Code Section
2518 3 and Section 204636 in an attempt to achieve uniform treat-
ment of disclaimers. The provisions were intended to clarify pro-
cedures to be followed to effectively disclaim property so that
the disclaimant would not be treated as the owner of the interest
for gift and estate tax purposes." Section 2518 (a) provides that
a qualified disclaimer with respect to an interest in property shall
be given effect as if the interest had never transferred to the dis-
claimant. Section 2518 (b) defines a qualified disclaimer and Sec-
tion 2046 incorporates these provisions for estate tax purposes.
These amendments apply to interests created by transfers made
after December 31, 1976.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 attempted to resolve many prob-
lems in the disclaimer area. A principal problem was how quick-
ly the recipient of an interest must disclaim in order to avoid gift
tax liability. The House Ways and Means Committee was par-
ticularly disturbed by cases as Keinath v. Commissioner, where
the court found that a remainderman could disclaim his interest
in a trust upon the death of the life tenant, even though this oc-
35. Pub. L. No. 94-455, tit. XX, § 2009(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1893.
36. Pub. L. No. 94-455, tit. XX, § 2009(b)(2), 90 Stat. 1520, 1893-4, amended by Pub. L.
No. 97-34, tit. IV, § 403(d)(3)(A)(i), 95 Stat. 172, 304 renumbering as I.R.C. § 2046.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 65-68 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356, 3419-22; S. CONF. REp. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 623-24 (1976);
General Explanation, Id. at 589-92.
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curred 19 years after the death of the grantor. 8 This problem was
dealt with by including in the definition of qualified disclaimer
a definite time period within which the disclaimer must be made.
The term "qualified disclaimer" means an irrevocable and un-
qualified refusal to accept an interest in property, if:
(1) the refusal is in writing, and
(2) such writing is received by the transferor, his legal
representative, or the holder of the legal title to the property no
later than nine months after the latter of the day on which the
transfer creating the interest is made or the day the disclaimant
attains the age of twenty-one. The legislative history indicates that
for purposes of the disclaimer provisions, the transfer creating
an interest must be a taxable one. The nine-month period is to
be determined in reference to each taxable transfer.39 Each potential
recipient can disclaim within nine months after the creation of
his interest.
(3) The disclaimant must not have accepted the interest or
any of its benefits. Acceptance of any consideration for disclaiming
an interest will be considered an acceptance of the benefit of the
interest.
(4) As a result of the disclaimer, the interest must pass to
another person without any direction on the part of the disclaim-
ant. Many practitioners believed that this requirement tied the
disclaimer provision back to state law, requiring that an attempt-
ed disclaimer be sufficient under state law to cause the property
to pass to a third party without any action on the disclaimant's
part. Thus an ineffective disclaimer under local law would be an
effective disclaimer under federal estate and gift tax law. However,
the House Ways and Means Committee report indicated that when
the requirements of the federal disclaimer provisions are satisfied,
the refusal to accept the property would be given effect for federal
estate and gift tax purposes even though state law did not
characterize the refusal as a disclaimer or if the person refusing
the property was considered to have been the owner of the prop-
erty before refusing acceptance of the property. 0
The Revenue Act of 1978 amended Section 2518 by providing
that when a surviving spouse refuses to accept an interest in prop-
38. 480 F.2d 57, 62-63 (8th Cir. 1973). In determining if the disclaimer had been made within
a reasonable time, the court used the death of the life tenant as the commencement of the time
period for disclaiming the remainder interest.
39. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 623 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4118, 4262.
40. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 190-91 (1981).
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erty, the disclaimer will be valid although the surviving spouse
receives an income interest with respect to the property if the in-
come interest does not result from any direction by the surviving
spouse and the disclaimer is otherwise qualified. 1 This amend-
ment was in direct response to the problem of a surviving spouse
disclaiming an interest in property under the marital deduction
provision of a will with the result that the property passed to a
trust in which the spouse had an income interest. Under the 1976
Act, the disclaimed interest must pass to a person other than the
person making the disclaimer. It was considered unclear as to
whether a disclaimer was valid when the surviving spouse
disclaimed and yet participated as an income beneficiary in a
residual type trust.
Proposed treasury regulations, published in the Federal
Register on July 22, 1980, provide guidelines for the treatment
of disclaimers made before the effective date of the 1976 Act and
disclaimers of post-1976 interests. 2 These proposed regulations
apparently recognize case law that had established that a fiduciary
could disclaim a decedent's interest in property prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1976. Proposed regulation section 25. 2518-(d)
(1) (ii) indicates that a fiduciary's disclaimer of a beneficial in-
terest does not meet the requirements of a qualified disclaimer
if the fiduciary exercised or retained a power to allocate enjoy-
ment of that interest among members of a designated class."
Due to the recent vintage of Section 2518, very few cases
have been decided or rulings issued interpreting the section." None
appear to be directly applicable to the question posed by the
hypothetical. A 1979 letter ruling provides some interpretative
information. Technical Advice Memorandum 793701 'S denied
that a purported disclaimer made by a Montana executor of a
deceased legatee's interest in the estate of her father, who was
a resident of Iowa, was a qualified disclaimer. The conclusion
of the letter ruling was that the disclaimer was not valid under
local law. Under Iowa law, the right to disclaim was personal
and terminated on the death of the legatee.6 The rationale of this
ruling would apparently not be violated when an executor or ad-
41. Pub. L. No. 95-600, tit. VII, § 702(m)(1), 92 Stat. 2763,2935 (codified at I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4)
(Supp. 1981)).
42. 45 Fed. Reg. 48922 (1980).
43. Id. at 48927.
44. 1 Estate & Gift Taxes FED. TAXES (P-H) 1 125,182 (1982).
45. LTR 7937011 (May 31, 1979).
46. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.704(3), amended by IowA CODE ANN. § 633.704(3)(c) (Supp.
1982-83).
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ministrator disclaimed a beneficiary's interest when it is not pro-
hibited by local law.
Recent legislation amends the disclaimer provision. The
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 amended Section 2518 by
adding a new paragraph (3) to subsection (c) which provides that
a written transfer of the transferor's interest in property to the
person who would have received the property had there been an
effective disclaimer will be treated as a valid disclaimer for federal
estate and gift tax purposes if the transfer is timely and the
transferor has not received any of the interest or its benefits."'
The intention of this amendment is that local law will be applicable
to determine the identity of the transferor, but the transfer does
not otherwise need to satisfy the requirements of a local disclaimer
law. Therefore, a written transfer of the transferor's entire interest
in property to a transferee who would have received the property
had a qualified disclaimer been made is treated as a qualified
disclaimer for estate and gift tax purposes. The fact that under
local law the transfer is not considered a disclaimer will not pre-
vent it from being a qualified disclaimer for federal estate and
gift tax purposes. This legislation untied the disclaimer provision
from state law for transfers made after 1981.
CONCLUSION
Existing disclaimer statutes adopt or prohibit disclaimers by
an executor or administrator. Although Mississippi has no general
disclaimer statute, the Mississippi Supreme Court adheres to the
common law rule allowing a general disclaimer. The court has
been liberal in allowing beneficiaries to rearrange testamentary
desires provided there are no limitations and all the beneficiaries
agree. The next logical step, therefore, would be to allow a de-
ceased beneficiary's executor or administrator to act on his behalf.
The Mississippi Supreme Court should allow a general disclaimer
by the executor or administrator of the wife's estate in the
hypothetical.
Internal Revenue Code Section 2518, as amended, still does
not specifically address the question posed by the hypothetical:
namely, whether an administrator or executor can disclaim his
deceased beneficiary's devise or bequest. There does not appear
to be anything in the legislative considerations which indicates
that Congress intended to change existing common law, which
47. Pub. L. No. 97-34, tit. IV, § 426(a), 95 Stat. 172, 318 (codified at I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3)
(Supp. 1981)).
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generally provides that the right of acceptance or renunciation is
not ended by the death of the devisee or legatee who had such
right. Additionally, proposed regulations under the pre-1981
disclaimer provisions apparently reflect that a fiduciary can
disclaim a decedent's interest in property.
In an effort to bring clarity and predictability to the estate
and gift tax consequences of disclaimers by executors and ad-
ministrators, the Mississippi legislature should address statutory
general disclaimers and this question in particular. Further, the
regulations of the Treasury Department should do likewise.
A practitioner drafting a will with a disclaimer provision
should consider including language enabling a deceased
beneficiary's personal representative to disclaim on behalf of the
beneficiary's estate should the circumstance present itself. Under
any circumstance, a disclaiming fiduciary should act with the
ratification and approval of all the beneficiaries or their represen-
tatives and preferably with court approval. A general disclaimer
by a personal representative should be precluded when it is clearly
the intention of the testator that such disclaimer should be per-
sonal to the beneficiary.
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